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IN 1776 Scottish philosopher Adam Smith published An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations, or as it is better known, The 
Wealth of Nations. In many mundane 
ways, Smith merely chronicled the 
burgeoning European industries he was 
observing; but, in doing so, he helped 
spread a revolutionary thinking about 
how factories could take advantage of 
specialization. Smith’s discussion of a 
visit to a pin factory has been re-told 
so often that many people probably 
know the story without knowing the 
source. The story goes like this: If you 
were to make a pin, how would you 
do it? Well, you need to cut some steel, 
pound and twist it into a wire, cut the 
wire, straighten it, sharpen one end, 
afϐix a tiny ball to the other, and once, 
say, 100 were ready, box them up for 
delivery. Smith records 18 distinct tasks 
involved in making a pin and opines 
that an untrained 18th century worker 
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could at best fashion one pin per day. 
Specialized training increases the 
output to a dozen per worker so that a 
factory of 100 workers might produce 
1200 pins. However, in the modern pin 
factory he visited, instead of training 
one person to do everything, workers 
were each trained for just one of the 18 
distinct tasks, and the factory produced 
48,000 pins per day. From automobiles 
to computers to packinghouses, 
specialization increases output while 
lowering cost per unit. This revolution 
in specialization also leads to increased 
demand for inputs. As output increases, 
more and more inputs must be secured, 
whether those inputs are steel or 
soybeans, plastic or pigs. But what 
happens in industries that compete 
for those inputs? They often become 
concentrated.
Meat processing became very 
specialized in the last 50 years. 
Processing plants today package most 
cuts directly in the plant instead of 
shipping carcasses to the retailer to 
butcher and package for individual 
sale. Instead of a retail butcher slicing 
all of the cuts off of a side of beef, 
specialized workers at the packing 
plant now make the cuts as the meat 
proceeds down an assembly line 
into a package that then goes to the 
supermarket for minor trimming if any. 
This change in processing required 
a massive reorganization of supply 
chains, transportation, and technology 
at processing plants and, once in place, 
gave processors the ability to take 
advantage of enormous economies of 
scale. The result was a dramatic decline 
in costs per ϐinished product. To further 
push processing costs down, packers 
needed to increase inputs so that the 
plants could take full advantage of the 
enormous size, technology, and labor 
used. Bigger plants meant fewer ϐirms 
were needed, leading to evermore 
concentration in the processing sector. 
Today, four ϐirms process 85 percent 
of cattle into beef (in value), four ϐirms 
process 66 percent of hogs into pork, 
and another four ϐirms process just 
over half of all turkeys (57 percent) 
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and broilers (51 percent) (USDA 2016). 
However, this concentration seems to 
have mostly slowed. These four ϐirms 
seem to be in no great hurry for further 
mergers and acquisitions. This can 
be for many reasons, but one of them 
could be that cost savings from scale 
are getting smaller. Securing inputs 
remains important, nonetheless. With 
fewer and fewer ϐirms buying more 
and more inputs, how do they compete 
with each other while taking advantage 
of specialization’s increasing demand 
for inputs? They secure their supplies 
through contracts.
This story is by now well-
known and quite consistent with 
how industries throughout food 
manufacturing evolved. As processors 
moved to specialization, they needed 
consistent supplies of inputs. Along 
with modernization came a move 
toward increased usage of contracting 
to secure supplies months ahead of 
delivery. Fifty years ago, only about 11 
percent of all agricultural goods were 
sold to processors via contracts; today 
it is closer to 40 percent (MacDonald 
2015). In livestock, the movement 
toward contracting was even more 
dramatic. Today, 98 percent of hogs, 
90 percent of poultry, and 70 percent 
of cattle are procured using some 
form of contracting (USDA 2016). The 
90 percent for poultry is misleading 
since it encompasses both turkeys 
and chicken for meat and eggs. In 
fact, nearly 100 percent of broilers 
(chickens sold exclusively for meat) 
are contract sales. Since the beef 
industry has lagged the poultry and 
hog industries in contract adoption, 
it has been natural to assume that the 
beef supply chain has merely been 
catching up. The conventional wisdom 
is that cash markets will mostly 
disappear. Perhaps that is inevitable. 
Forecasting industry structure is 
always difficult. However, we recently 
reviewed a great deal of research 
and data related to US livestock 
production and have concluded that 
the beef industry might be slower 
to move toward an increased usage 
of contracts. In terms of the benefits 
of specialization, a steer is neither a 
four-legged chicken nor a big pig. 
First of all, to accommodate 
specialization, it can help if the 
input (the animal in this case) is 
homogeneous. Getting chickens and 
pigs to conform to standard sizes and 
quality is actually easier to do if you 
are starting at a stage of heterogeneity. 
Think of American chickens and pigs 
at the beginning of the 20th century—
breeds differed, feed was mostly 
scraps and varied grains, animals 
often rummaged around farms, and 
chicken sold for meat was usually 
once the bird’s egg production waned. 
Once scientiϐically controlled genetics, 
feeding, and developing of animals 
purely for meat were brought into 
the industries, great advances in yield 
developed to take advantage of the 
scale of specialization that could also 
be brought to bear in the processing 
industries. However, because of their 
enormous capital costs, humans had 
been breeding cattle with great care 
and for speciϐic purposes for thousands 
of years. Cattle bred speciϐically for 
Securing inputs remains 
important, nonetheless. With 
fewer and fewer fi rms buying 
more and more inputs, how 
do they compete with each 
other while taking advantage 
of specialization’s increasing 
demand for inputs?
meat derived from hundreds of hybrids 
over centuries into a handful of sturdy 
breeds that we use today. There are still 
improvements, of course, but the yield 
for cattle because of specialization was 
much less in the last century compared 
to poultry and hogs. In other words, 
because beef cattle became specialized 
much sooner, there is less room for 
productivity gains today.
Likewise, economists have shown 
that the processing efϐiciency gains, 
while increasing in all industries, have 
increased at a slower rate for beef than 
for pork and poultry. Yield, breeding, 
transportation, and logistic gains that 
resulted from moving chickens and 
hogs inside into controlled feeding 
operations do not have the same 
beneϐits for a large ruminant. Although 
the move to mind-bogglingly large 
cattle feedlots is astounding, it is 
important to note that nearly all of the 
cattle in those lots spend one-third to 
one-half of their lives in a pasture or 
range before they begin eating grain 
to fatten them for the packer. Why 
not specialize by moving calves into 
feedlots directly? With 155 million 
acres of federally subsidized rangeland  
(BLM 2017), feedlots are arguably at 
a competitive disadvantage for calf 
feeding, especially during spring and 
summer months when cheap forage is 
available to so many in the West. Even 
outside of the West where private lands 
exist, rangeland is still relatively cheap. 
While hogs and poultry can be raised 
anywhere in conϐinement, leaving 
good farmland to be used for proϐitable 
crops like corn and soybeans, cattle are 
raised on land that is already marginal. 
Moving cattle to feedlots does not free 
land for other uses because much of 
that land simply has no other uses.    
For these and other reasons that 
we explain in much more detail in 
Crespi and Saitone (2018), we ϐind 
that the current level of contract usage 
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in cattle procurement might be about 
optimal for cattle markets today. Of 
course, markets can change: new trade 
deals or the need for more stringent 
labeling, for example, might make 
contracting more important. Barring 
dramatic changes to demand, cattle 
might be at a point on the production 
function that makes movements 
to specialization less fruitful and, 
therefore, creates less need to control 
throughput into the processing 
facilities. Specialization may have 
reached its limit.
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LAST NOVEMBER, we wrote an article (Shao et al. 2018) documenting the development of 
African Swine Fever (ASF) in China and 
its impacts on regional hog and pork 
prices. Since then, ASF has continued to 
ravage China’s hog industry with 62 new 
cases from November 1, 2018 to March 
27, 2019, resulting in a total of 114 cases. 
The total inventory of hog factories with 
ASF outbreaks has increased from 61,214 
to 319,726 (click here to see an animated 
map of ASF cases in China). The pace of the 
outbreaks has somewhat slowed down 
from more than 20 cases per month in 
November and December last year to 
less than 10 cases per month this year. 
It is possible that the number of cases 
is greater than that reported, in part 
because provinces and producers do not 
have the economic incentive to report. In 
this article, we update the impacts of ASF 
on China’s hog inventory, pork imports, 
and future soybean imports. 
On January 24, China’s government 
published an updated ASF emergency 
response protocol (MOA 2019) that 
shortened the post-outbreak period 
a facility must wait before resuming 
production—a sign that government 
is actively attempting to limit the 
impacts of outbreaks. However, new 
cases continue to pop up in scattered 
locations and in large facilities, 
suggesting that an effective method to 
contain the disease is still elusive. 
According to ofϐicial reports, 
the number of culled pigs is 
modest—916,000 as of January 
(Chen 2019)—but recent inventory 
statistics show a much larger impact. In 
December, January, and February, hog 
inventory dropped by 3.7 percent, 5.7 
percent, and 5.4 percent respectively, 
a total of 14.1 percent, or 45 million 
pigs (see Figure 1). During these 
three months, sow inventory, which 
determines production capacity in 
the next year, also decreased by 13 
Figure 1. Monthly changes in China’s hog inventory 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture of China
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percent, or 4 million sows. As part of its 
efforts to control the disease, the Chinese 
government outlawed the feeding of 
household waste to pigs. It seems likely 
that the farms relying on this form of 
feeding are the farms reducing their 
inventory. 
After the ASF outbreak began, the 
Chinese government restricted cross-
province hog and pork transportation 
(see Shao et al. 2018 for details), which 
resulted in regional hog and pork 
imbalance and price divergence (see 
Figure 2). Arguably, these policies have 
caused more turmoil than the disease 
itself. In December 2019, realizing 
the detrimental effects of complete 
cross-province transportation ban, the 
government allowed “point-to-point” 
live hog transportation from hog farms 
to slaughterhouses in other provinces 
(MOA 2018a). The rules for which farms 
and slaughterhouses qualify for point-
to-point transportation favor large 
producers, which could accelerate the 
upscaling of China’s hog industry. As a 
result of this relaxation of transportation 
restrictions and the slowing down of the 
disease, regional prices substantially 
converged by February 2019, as seen in 
Figure 2 (for more detailed graphs see 
Inouye 2019). China’s hog market in the 
near future will be driven by the overall 
inventory decline instead of regional 
imbalance.
The damage of ASF has already 
signiϐicantly inϐluenced China’s pork 
imports. After the initial tariff increase 
on US pork in April 2018 (Li 2018), pork 
exports to China reduced to a trickle. 
In December 2018, US exports to China 
started to pick up with 7,823 metric 
tons of pork exported by the ϐirst week 
of January 2019. After several weeks of 
zero exports, trade resumed with 17,215 
metric tons exported in the second 
week of February 2019. The net sales of 
23,846 metric tons in the ϐirst week of 
March was the third-largest weekly sale 
since USDA started publishing weekly 
country-speciϐic export data. The 
damage of ASF has already signiϐicantly 
inϐluenced China’s pork imports. After 
the initial tariff increase on US pork in 
April 2018 (Li 2018), pork exports to 
China reduced to a trickle. In December 
2018, US exports to China started to 
pick up with 7,823 metric tons of pork 
exported by the ϐirst week of January 
2019. After several weeks of zero 
exports, trade resumed with 17,215 
metric tons exported in the second 
week of February 2019. The net sales 
of 23,846 metric tons in the ϐirst week 
of March was the third-largest weekly 
sale since USDA started publishing 
weekly country-speciϐic export data. As 
of the writing of this article, the total 
commitment (total export+outstanding 
sales) of pork export to China is at 
142,845 metric tons, almost ϐive times 
the total export to China last year 
(Figure 3).  Given the high tariffs, the 
Chinese government is likely behind 
these purchases, either by directly 
ordering state-owned ϐirms to buy or by 
waiving tariffs. In this regard, we note 
that COFCO, a state-owned enterprise, 
did not pay a duty on imported soybeans 
destined for the state reserve. 
In recent media reports, it has been 
suggested that China will purchase 
300,000 tons of US pork this year 
(Mayeda 2019). This may explain 
the rapid increase in CME lean hog 
futures contracts. The sustainability 
Figure 2. Live hog prices by region 
Source: Zhue.com.cn, adopted from Inouye (2019)
Figure 3. Cumulative pork export from the United States to China 
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of strong export performance to China 
will depend on the outcome of the 
ongoing trade talk as well as export 
competition from the European Union 
(EU), which accounted for 76 percent of 
pork exports to China in 2018. However, 
the EU’s hope of exporting more pork 
to China this year is clouded by the 
discovery of ASF in member countries 
including Belgium, Poland, Latvia, 
Hungary, and Romania, among others.
While ASF brings opportunities 
for pork exporters, it is bad news for 
soybean exporters. According to our 
estimation, a 14 percent decrease in 
pork production would lead to a 10 
percent decrease in soybean import 
demand.1 In addition to the negative 
impact caused by ASF, the recent 
change in China’s feed protein standard 
may also decrease soybean demand. 
On October 26, 2018, anticipating 
potential difϐiculty in soybean imports 
due to the trade war, the China Feed 
Industry Association published a new 
feed standard (MOA 2018b) with lower 
minimum protein requirements for 
hog feed. Ofϐicial sources in China have 
estimated that this policy change could 
result in an 11-million-ton reduction in 
soybean meal demand and a 14-million-
ton (16 percent) reduction in soybean 
import demand (MOA 2018b). ASF and 
the change in feed standard together 
would result in a 24 percent reduction 
in soybean import demand.
In summary, the ASF outbreak in 
China has caused impacts larger than 
what the ofϐicial number of culled pigs 
would imply. China’s hog inventory 
has decreased by 14 percent while 
sow inventory has decreased by 13 
percent. While in the earlier months 
of ASF the Chinese market was driven 
by regional imbalance, it is now driven 
by the sharp reduction in overall herd 
size. The perspective of shortage and 
high prices has driven China to import 
large amounts of pork from the United 
States despite the tariff. We expect that 
high imports are likely to continue, 
especially if trade talks progress 
smoothly. At the same time, ASF and 
the reduced feed protein standard may 
reduce soybean export to China by 24 
percent, other things being equal.  
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IT’S A fascinating, but uncertain, time in the agricultural markets. Global and US supplies of agricultural 
products are at or near record levels. 
At the same time, global demand for 
agricultural products continues to 
grow, pressured by both population 
and income growth. Markets work to 
distribute the products across the globe, 
and government policies can deϐinitely 
shape that distribution. Myriad new 
trade agreements, trade disputes, and 
tariffs introduced over the last 15 
months are reshaping global agricultural 
trade ϐlows. Some of that reshaping has 
been beneϐicial to US producers, while 
some of it has been harmful. Trade 
policy does not exist in a vacuum—while 
a tariff may be targeted at one speciϐic 
country, the tariff ’s impact can (and 
often does) spread beyond the borders 
of the two countries involved, which is 
true of trade agreements as well. The 
impacts of the trade agreements are not 
limited to only those countries within 
the agreement.
Global trade policy is going through 
a period of major change. There’s the 
US-China trade dispute, the reworking of 
NAFTA/USMCA and KORUS agreements, 
the ongoing tensions from the US 
steel and aluminum tariffs, the trade 
challenges over Britain’s exit from the 
European Union, and the establishment 
of the Trans-Paciϐic Partnership (TPP) 
without the inclusion of the United 
States. These policy changes are bringing 
some trade partners closer together, 
pushing some further away, and creating 
conϐlicting signals in many cases. To 
explore recent trade ϐlow changes, we 
examine export sales so far this year 
versus at this point last year. The four 
ϐigures follow the same basic pattern. 
The ϐirst six bars show the export sale 
The Yin and Yang of Agricultural Trade
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Figure 1. Shifts in US Beef Export Sales 
Source: USDA-FAS
Figure 2. Shifts in US Pork Export Sales 
Source: USDA-FAS
Figure 3. Shifts in US Corn Export Sales 
Source: USDA-FAS
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changes to the six largest current export 
markets for each commodity, listed 
in order. “Other” shows the export 
sale changes to the rest of the world. 
“Unknown” shows the change in sales to 
unknown destinations (with an export 
sale, the destination does not have to be 
listed until the shipment is ready to go). 
“Total” summarizes the overall change 
in export sales. The percentage given 
in each bar is the percent change year-
over-year for that country or region.
For the livestock sector, trade has 
been a positive factor for the past few 
years. Global income growth has driven 
meat demand higher and both the beef 
and pork industries have beneϐitted 
from that surge in demand. However, 
the beginning of 2019 has shown some 
reversal in that fortune. Beef export 
sales have dropped by 3.1 percent year-
over-year (see Figure 1). While Hong 
Kong has purchased more US beef, 
beef sales to our other large markets 
are down. Some of the reduction was 
expected—for example, South Korea 
purchased a record amount of beef  last 
year, partially in preparation for and 
celebration of the Winter Olympics. 
However, there is some concern that 
the progress with the TPP deal is 
taking a bite out of beef exports. Japan, 
Mexico, and Canada are all part of TPP, 
along with Australia, which is another 
major beef exporter. The lower beef 
tariffs within TPP are providing 
opportunities for Australia to gain 
beef market share at the expense 
of the United Sta tes. But while beef 
exports are currently down, USDA’s 
projections indicate beef exports 
could be up by roughly 2 percent at 
year’s end.
The TPP effect may also be 
showing up in pork exports. Mexico 
and Japan have reduced their pork 
purchases from the United States; 
however, Australia, another TPP 
member, has expanded its pork 
purchases. As with beef, South Korea 
has backed down signiϐicantly. But 
the major shift over the past few 
weeks is due to China. Throughout 
2018, China and the United States 
have argued about trade and imposed 
tariffs on each other. When those 
tariffs hit pork, export sales to China 
dropped dramatically. During this 
period, China has also been dealing 
with the ramiϐications of African 
Swine Fever. The Chinese hog industry 
has signiϐicantly culled its herd in an 
attempt to halt the disease’s spread. 
And while this sizable reduction in 
pork capacity was expected to force 
China to expand purchases in the 
global pork market, those expected 
sales did not show up as the 2018 
calendar year closed. The 2019 
calendar year for pork opened similar 
to beef, with an overall reduction in sales. 
However, over the past four weeks, the 
United States has seen a sizable uptick 
in sales to China. Currently, pork export 
sales to China are up 170 percent. This 
increase in sales is happening even 
though the pork tariff remains in place. It 
looks as though the African Swine Fever 
outbreak has ϐinally grown large enough 
to have major global impacts. Looking 
forward, USDA expects pork exports to 
remain roughly 6 percent ahead of last 
year (see Figure 2).
Shifting to crops, the 2018 calendar 
year was a mixed bag on the export front. 
Corn exports were relatively strong, 
while soybean exports suffered as the 
US-China trade dispute grew. Export 
sales so far in 2019 have indicated a 
further erosion in the global market. 
For corn, the largest changes have 
been in sales to unknown destinations. 
Compared to last year, we have seen 
a 200 million bushel drop in sales to 
unknown destinations (see Figure 3). 
Usually, these sales ultimately end up 
being shipped to our larger markets. So, 
while the bars for our six largest export 
markets are generally headed higher, the 
reduction to unknown destinations could 
indicate that this is a short-term illusion.
Meanwhile, for soybeans, the major 
story is still the dispute with China. 
While China has made several purchases 
during the trade truce, the export deϐicit 
compared to last year remains incredibly 
large. The soybean tariffs are responsible 
for the 600 million bushel plus hole in 
exports. And as both the United States 
and China deal with the trade disruption, 
many other countries are adjusting 
their soybean trades to compensate, 
both in terms of quantities and sources. 
China was very aggressive in the South 
American soybean markets, displacing 
traditional customers there. In fact, they 
were so aggressive that Argentina has 
had to import soybeans to keep their 
Figure 4. Shifts in US Soybean Export Sales
Source: USDA-FAS
continued on page 8
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domestic soybean crushing facilities 
running. It is rare for Argentina to 
purchase US soybeans, as they are 
the third-largest soybean producer 
in the world. Last year at this time, 
Argentina had purchased no soybeans 
from the United States (hence, the 
“% not available” notation on their 
bar). Several other countries and 
regions (the European Union, Mexico, 
Egypt, etc.) have shifted some of their 
purchases from South America to the 
United States. Those additional sales 
have helped close some of the Chinese 
gap, overall soybean export sales are 
still down roughly 300 million bushels 
(see Figure 4).
Exports remain a key feature for 
US agriculture, but 2019 is starting 
out fairly rough. The ratiϐication and 
implementation of the USMCA and 
KORUS agreements should solidify 
export sales with three of our largest 
partners (Canada, Mexico, and South 
Korea). However, the bigger impacts 
for 2019 will likely come from two 
other trade stories, the potential for a 
deal with China and the impact of the 
lack of participation in TPP. The TPP 
fallout may already be showing up in 
the livestock markets, and the lack of a 
breakthrough with China continues to 
cast a shadow over soybeans. 
Th e Yin and Yang of Agricultural Trade
continued from page 7
IT IS easy to convince Iowa farmers that the trade war with China has substantial costs, as current 
agricultural commodity prices reϐlect 
reduced export demand. Rather than 
bear the burden of retaliatory tariffs, 
China moved toward other sources and 
substitutes for soybeans (see related 
article by Chad Hart and Lee Schultz 
in this issue of the APR) . The adverse 
export-demand shock is absorbed 
within the US market by inventory (and 
eventually production) adjustments and 
price reductions, and farm revenues fall 
as a result. This narrative might well 
outline the primary mechanism by which 
many Iowa farmers feel the pain of the 
trade war, but it is woefully incomplete.
In an effort to explain the impacts, 
economists often adopt simple market 
models of supply and demand. However, 
looking at the market for soybeans (or 
any other export good or service) in 
isolation provides an incomplete picture 
that fails to identify the adverse impacts 
of the US tariffs on Iowa’s farmers, 
independent of China’s retaliation. 
International Trade Policy: Insights from a 
General-equilibrium Approach
Edward J. Balistreri
ebalistr@iastate.edu
Perhaps more importantly, it fails to 
provide a compelling argument against 
the trade war beyond the farm. Under 
the same isolated construct, one might 
argue that from the perspective of steel 
and aluminum workers the trade war 
is exactly what America needs, and the 
longer it lasts the better. 
In this article, I highlight some 
general-equilibrium principles 
for thinking about international 
trade and argue that a general-
equilibrium perspective is essential 
for understanding the impacts of trade 
disputes. Only from this perspective 
can we consistently evaluate the 
beneϐits and costs of trade policy. The 
overwhelming conclusion from this 
perspective is that international trade 
is net beneϐicial—the beneϐits from 
international trade outweigh the costs 
when evaluated across all markets. 
The principles that dominate our 
modern study of international trade 
were established by David Ricardo 
over 200 years ago (Ricardo 1817). 
Ricardo’s guidance on how to think 
about international trade might be 
viewed in two ways—a great theory 
that endures because it is correct, or 
an antiquated idea that needs revision. 
Skepticism around Ricardo’s ideas is 
understandable, especially the strong 
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conclusion of the gains from trade. 
Does free trade really generate positive 
outcomes for everyday people, or is it 
something the elites promote because it 
beneϐits them?
Among economists, Ricardo’s 
theory of trade is best known by 
the subtle idea that a pattern of 
comparative (as opposed to absolute) 
cost advantages is sufϐicient for gains 
from trade. That’s ϐine, but what does 
it have to do with everyday people 
and does it add to the current policy 
debate? Frustratingly, a clear statement 
of comparative advantage requires an 
almost cartoonish characterization 
of the economy. We most often adopt 
Ricardo’s construct of a model where 
the whole world is reduced to two 
countries (England and Portugal) and 
two goods (wine and cloth). For the 
average Iowan, it is probably sufϐicient 
to say that Iowa is a good place to 
grow corn and soybeans and there is 
international demand for these goods. 
Similarly, China is a good place to 
produce photovoltaic solar panels and 
there is international demand for these 
solar panels. 
So what can we get out of Ricardo’s 
theory that is relevant? First, Ricardo 
takes a clear general-equilibrium 
approach. We cannot consider 
international trade in wine without 
thinking about how this interacts with 
other markets. Second, the Ricardian 
model takes a distinct barter approach 
to international trade (e.g., England 
trades cloth for Spanish wine or Iowa 
trades soybeans for photovoltaic solar 
panels). Again, this is a bit cartoonish, 
but the barter approach provides an 
important simpliϐication that facilitates 
a deeper understanding of critical 
issues like trade deϐicits (as discussed 
later) and the distribution of the gains 
from trade. Clearly, the gains from 
trade will not be distributed equally 
among countries or people within 
those countries. Modern extensions 
of general-equilibrium theory, in fact, 
show clear groups of winners and 
losers (Stolper and Samuelson 1941). A 
general-equilibrium model only shows 
that within a country the beneϐits to the 
winners are greater than the costs to 
the losers. In an ideal world we could 
redistribute the gains through a clever 
tax policy. While international trade 
clearly has distributional impacts, 
trade restrictions are a poor choice for 
redistribution—the general-equilibrium 
approach clearly shows that direct 
subsidies achieving the same level of 
production are less costly than tariffs.
The general-equilibrium approach 
is also particularly useful in dispelling 
some popular misconceptions about 
trade. The following statements are 
easily falsiϐied under the most basic 
general-equilibrium trade models: 
1. Exports are good, and imports are 
bad.
2. Trade is a zero-sum game.
3. Countries lose when they trade 
with low-wage countries.
4. Countries lose when they trade 
with distorted or planned 
economies.
5. Small countries lose out to large 
countries in trade.
6. Trade deϐicits will be reduced by 
tariffs.
7. Trade deϐicits represent a 
country’s losses from trade.
8. The gains from trade are higher 
for a country that has a trade 
surplus.
9. Trade wars can be won.
10. It is easy to win a trade war.
Trade imbalances are the most 
misunderstood and misused statistics in 
all of trade policy. Trade deϐicits sound 
bad, and some politicians leverage this 
for their beneϐit. Once we consider trade 
deϐicits through a general-equilibrium 
lens they are not so scary. International 
trade economists tend not to be worried 
about trade deϐicits, due to trade deϐicits 
being largely separable from tariffs and 
other trade policy distortions that are 
harmful.
So what is a trade deϐicit and 
what does it mean? First, we need to 
understand that the trade balance is a 
component of an important general-
equilibrium accounting identity—the 
balance of payments. The balance of 
payments is essentially a ledger of a 
country’s international transactions, 
and just like standard accounting, every 
debit is accompanied by a credit. If 
I sell a zucchini at the local farmer’s 
market for $1 my CPA would say there 
is a $1 debit to my vegetable account 
and a $1 credit to my cash account. The 
balance of payments does this type 
of accounting for a country’s imports 
and exports, although it is a bit more 
complex because trade partners use 
different currencies.
Let us examine how the balance of 
payments works. Imagine the United 
States wants to buy a solar panel from 
China. Which currency is used in the 
transaction, dollars or yuan? Let us say 
that China is willing to accept payment 
in dollars. Solar panel producers in 
China, however, have to pay for inputs 
in yuan, so why would the Chinese 
accept dollars? There are really only 
two possibilities. First, China may 
want to buy something that dollars 
do buy, like US produced soybeans. 
Second, they may want to hold dollar 
denominated assets as an investment 
(e.g., a bond). If the original purchase 
was in yuan the outcome is the same—
the US must acquire yuan by selling 
goods or services (soybeans) or an 
asset (bonds) to China. In this example, 
the balance of payments states that 
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the value of US imports of solar panels 
minus the value of soybean exports 
must equal the number of bonds sold to 
foreigners. Imbalanced trade does not 
mean that some country gets something 
for nothing, and it does not mean that 
some country wins relative to another. 
Imbalanced trade simply means that a 
country is engaging in normal economic 
activities—borrowing from or lending 
to the rest of the world. Some may 
contend that borrowing is bad, but is it 
really? Are mortgages bad? What about 
equipment loans? Borrowing is only 
bad, even over a long horizon, if the 
interest you pay exceeds your discount 
rate, but if that were true the remedy is 
simple: don’t borrow.
In a general-equilibrium model, 
asking why the United States has a 
trade deϐicit is equivalent to asking why 
foreign countries like holding dollar 
denominated assets; or, equivalently, 
why the United States sells so many 
high-quality bonds. To the extent that 
aggregate US savings rates are relatively 
low, which is partially driven by the 
expanding government budget deϐicit, 
we will have a trade deϐicit. In Ricardo’s 
general equilibrium everything is 
connected; thus, soybean demand 
depends on Chinese tariffs, but it also 
depends on US import tariffs and 
how many bonds we need to sell to 
foreigners to ϐinance our tax cuts.
These theoretical discussions are 
understandably tiring, so let’s look at 
some real numbers. In 2018, I joined 
a team of researchers in measuring 
the economic impacts of the trade war 
using a detailed general-equilibrium 
simulation model. See Balistreri et 
al. (2018) for the full study, including 
appropriate caveats associated with 
particular assumptions and results. To 
illustrate the ϐindings, I reproduce here 
the impacts on real US Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) decomposed into 
expenditure categories and income by 
sector (including tax payments). Table 
1 shows that the overall impact is a 
loss of $67 billion in GDP. The sectoral 
income decomposition clearly shows 
the distributional impacts—gains in 
electronic equipment manufacturing 
and ferrous metals and losses in 
oil seeds (e.g., soybeans) and meat 
products (e.g., pork and poultry). The 
general-equilibrium perspective on 
international trade is particularly 
useful in this context because it 
considers all impacts of the new tariffs, 
provides a consistent assessment of 
the winners and losers, and measures 
the net loss in income.
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